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ABSTRACT: The University Nanosatellite Program of the Air Force Research Laboratory provides a
paradigm-changing environment for the leaders of tomorrow’s space industry to envision solutions for
today’s small satellites. The products of the Program are an educated, experienced workforce that will
meet the demands of tomorrow, along with a spectrum of small satellite technologies onboard student-built
nanosatellite flight missions. This paper reveals intangible aspects of the systems engineering and
integration process that are usually lacking in new hires. Students involved in the UNP program come out
with an experienced perspective well beyond what the current higher education system provides. Examples
of success and failure at the university level are presented. Management of technical and programmatic
requirements and risks are addressed, including such issues as constricted university budgets and heavy
personnel turnover. Quality control and systems engineering methodologies are also discussed. Two
separate, concurrent University Nanosatellite Program-sponsored projects will be presented as case studies.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The University Nanosatellite Program (UNP) of the Air
Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Air Force Office
of Scientific Research (AFOSR) and Space Vehicles
Directorate (VS) provides a paradigm-changing
environment for the leaders of tomorrow’s space
industry to envision solutions for today’s small
satellites.
The University Nanosatellite Program is a one-of-a
kind outreach operation which develops partnerships
between the Air Force, NASA, AIAA and industry
participants and universities interested in small satellite
design and flight build. This symbiotic relationship
allows for a direct link between experts in the field and
students working on small satellite projects at the
university level. The result of that interplay is a unique
educational experience based on rigorous engineering
practices.
Created in 1999, UNP has evolved into a two-year
recurring university student satellite competition.
Through funding, workshops, and an intense projectreview process, the program allows students to gain a
wealth of experience while implementing their ideas in
flight-worthy space-hardware. In return, the university
students provide development of technologies of
interest to the small-satellite community, and discover
low-cost solutions to existing problems in the field.
Approximately a dozen U. S. universities participate in
each two year competition. The universities all develop
their own individual missions and hardware. At the end
of the two years, the winner of the competition is
chosen to go through final integration and test at AFRL.
The products of the Program are an educated,
experienced workforce that will meet the demands of
tomorrow, along with a spectrum of flight-worthy
technologies, and flyable nanosatellite missions.
LEARNING EVOLUTION
In today’s environment, the spacecraft industry’s
products are specifically designed for a certain mission.
Even experimental satellites cost an estimated $50-100
million to go from concept to flight. Operational
systems have per-unit costs of hundreds of millions to
billions of dollars. An analogy to a car manufacturer
being required to design a car to one individual’s
preferences can be drawn. Imagine if Ford Motor
Company had to build a car not only for example,
“middle class single men, 25-35”, but for “John Smith,
5’ 7”, 156lbs, lives in Colorado where there is a 47.6%
chance that he’ll need to drive up curvy mountainous
roads in the wintertime, has 2 dogs that shed, has back
pain, large fingers, plays soccer twice a week, and if he

drives a Dodge, Ford goes out of business.” The
specifications in the space industry run parallel to the
latter type of detail. More often than not, designers
must learn how to fit the puzzle pieces together in a tug
of war between disciplines in order to walk the thin line
between achievement and ineptitude.
How does one change this model? Can it be changed?
Should it? Here, we only provide an account of how
U.S. universities within the University Nanosatellite
Program have started, in essence, an experiment in
evolution driven by the extreme environment of short
duration, personnel turnover, inexperience and little
corporate memory, and evaporative budget limitations.
In essence, the Program is Darwinian—subjecting its
participants to survival within an intense, real-world
environment, forcing the students to quickly learn the
design, build, and test techniques which work the best.
Time and schedule shape the design-to-build
environment in which the university programs compete
to meet the UNP criteria, the requirements imposed by
their missions, and to build functioning flight-hardware.
The university with the leanest solutions has the "best"
space mission and hardware, and wins the flight
competition. Through this process, an exceptionally
talented and experienced new workforce evolves.
The university team participants in UNP are severely
constrained: build a spacecraft in less than two years
from scratch with a few dozen untrained students, no
real world experience, balance the rigor of an
engineering or science curriculum, and, by the way, the
spacecraft mission needs to be state of the art. Do this
for free (or much less per year than you will make as a
starting engineer), all the while maintaining your grade
point average, and possibly writing a thesis.
Of course, while the environment of resource
constraints is extreme, the Program Office at AFRL
provides substantial guidance. Program requirements
and constraints are delineated and design standards and
suggestions are “highly encouraged” to all universities
in the competition. By having the general problem
(designing a mission from scratch) bounded for them,
the schools' efforts usually progress to similar nanosat
bus systems, while maintaining very unique payloads
and mission architectures.
The glue that holds everything together is the long term
memory of AFRL personnel and a robust systems
engineering process. Dedicated systems engineering
processes account for professional quality of the
student-built designs, without wasting university (and
government) time, money, or personnel resources. To
accomplish this, considerable effort by students and
AFRL personnel is required. Industry-standard best
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practices, such as developing rigorous mission-driven
requirements up front, adherence to specific
documentation standards (prove on paper what you
build), and the philosophy of simplicity and safety of
design are constantly hammered into the students'
mindsets. The highest achievers in the competition
employ strict systems engineering rigor to their design
process. The more experienced students typically
gravitate to the student systems engineer role in their
respective university design teams. The effort required
to build a flyable nanosat is exhaustive. During critical
design, build, and test periods, Nanosat team members
typically sleep a handful of hours per night, forego
lucrative internships, and sacrifice social life with no
motivation other than the slim chance that what they
work on will indeed someday orbit the earth. Upon
graduation, their experience often lands them in
aerospace positions with salaries years beyond what the
typical "fresh-outs" earn.

“The need to replace retiring workers over the next 10
years, however, demonstrates the crucial need to start
refilling the “pipeline” of qualified workers now.
Analysis of the economic benefits of apprenticeship
programs shows an impressive $50 return for every
dollar of federal investment.” – Final Report Of The
Commission On The Future Of The United States
Aerospace Industry, Nov 2002.

WHY ARE WE DOING THIS?

The University Nanosat Program survives on funding
literally orders of magnitude below the average
spaceflight program in the U.S. This is not to compare
the quality of flight products, but only to make the point
that education efforts within government and industry
need not take on gargantuan investments to achieve the
maximum desired effect, which is giving trainees
extensive real-world experience. This effects-based
education method fills the critical space systems
engineering gap in U.S. university curricula, at minimal
cost to the taxpayer, while greatly benefiting the space
industry.

“Now is the time to reignite the passionate interest in
space and science education. However, the manner that
we go about doing this is critical to success. We cannot
be content with short-term solutions for ideas or
thinking.” – Dr. Patricia Arnold, Vice President of
Education, U.S. Space Foundation

Figure 2 illustrates the decline of enrollment of
aerospace engineering undergraduates in American
universities for the years shown. While there is a slight
resurgence, many of the enrollments are foreign
nationals, contributing little to the long term
replenishment of the U. S. workforce.

The prime driver for UNP is the education of America’s
space workforce in the 21st century. As Figure 1
illustrates, the size of the U.S. aerospace workforce has
steadily declined since the 1980's, and needs
replenishment if the U. S. is to maintain a leadership
role in space.

Figure 2. U. S. University Aerospace Engineering
Enrollments, 1987-2001 3
Since its inception, thousands of science and
engineering students have participated in UNP, from
freshman up to PhD candidates. UNP involvement
since the Program's inception in 1999 has been 30 U.S.
universities, with approximately a dozen being funded
during any given two-year Program cycle. UNP also
maintains contacts with approximately 15 U.S.
universities that have healthy space curricula. The
Program has been credited with assisting burgeoning
university programs—universities that desire a foothold
in hands-on space research. It is likely that the upward
trend shown in aerospace enrollments may be at least
partially attributable to programs like UNP.

Figure 1. Aerospace Workers
in the U. S. 1989-2002 3
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and activities of the learners? On one hand, students
should be held to high responsibility over their designs
and hardware, but on the other hand, lack of experience
causes a certain amount of unpredictability at the
potential expense of delivery and flight. At what point
does the significant effort required to fly start to
supplant self-motivated student education? The answer
lies in the fact that most of the effort of flying a satellite
occurs after the design phase, during assembly,
integration, test, launch and on-orbit operations.
Therefore, the UNP Program Office gives significant
management and systems engineering assistance to the
winning universities during these stages—including
help with designing simple, robust GSE, launch vehicle,
and ground operations interfaces—in an effort to
expose the students to the intense nature of these
processes.
This delicate "hands-on-vs-hands-off"
balance enables the students to experience and run a
real flight program, while knocking down the
substantial roadblocks to flight for "amateur" payloads.
In the end, this approach allows UNP to maintain both
the flight aspect and the educational excellence of the
Program.

For the participating students, what is discovered is that
attitudes of the team—especially the acceptance of real
engineering responsibility on the part of the individual
members—is inherently critical. This “real-world”
lesson is highly valuable, as individuals can see
immediately the effects of their efforts. At the
university level, without the burden and empowerment
falling directly on individuals (coupled with the false
assumption that someone else will pick up the burden
once dropped), the education value is greatly
diminished and the hardware design and build efforts
are unsuccessful. Regardless of each team’s level of
success at integrating a working, flyable spacecraft, the
University Nanosat Program always achieves its goal of
a highly talented, experienced workforce. Those
universities that do succeed to flight gain exposure to
the full space mission lifecycle before they even enter
the workforce—an accomplishment that many
professional U.S. aerospace workers never experience
over the course of their entire careers.
TECHNICAL AND PROGRAMMATIC RISKS
Just as the universities operate under severe constraints
(programmatically and technically), those responsible
for sponsoring and running educational, high-risk flight
programs such as UNP are faced with similar
challenges. The difficulty of UNP is in the balance
between achieving a worthwhile and high yield
educational program, while still holding to tight
schedule and funding constraints. The UNP Program
Office at AFRL faces the challenge of "bringing
students up the learning curve" during the flight
competition phase. Occasionally, momentum fluctuates
from one design review or event to the next based on
the commitment to excellence that the students have
invested at that section of the competition, but in
general this phase runs more or less smoothly, due to
the fact that most of the participating students are
highly motivated.

While all of the teams participating in the flight
competition learn the rigor of design, communication
and commitment, the truly unique experience occurs for
the satellite designs that are chosen to continue on to
integration and test. The university is still the expert on
the satellite and integration can not proceed without the
university. Here, the students not only learn to support
the operations of their satellite but experience what
many do not get to experience—the substantial
technical, managerial, economic, political and personal
effort required to place a spacecraft on orbit. Certain
universities have approached this in several different
ways. First, some have fielded a veritable army of
students and can easily support activities either
remotely or on location at test facilities or launch—the
students not necessarily having to be overly dedicated
individually. Second, some universities can support
such activities equally well, but supplement students
with full-time university employees who understand the
satellite system and provide a corporate memory in the
face of student turnover. Third, some universities have
a very small group of the core student team that are
dedicated and motivated enough to expertly know all
systems and give up a significant amount of their time
to the program. From previous UNP experience, the
Three Corner Satellite (Nanosat-2)—built by New
Mexico State, Colorado at Boulder, and Arizona State
Universities—had all three types of support. Is this
necessary? Experience says yes. The critical factor is
the ability for the university to provide the necessary
support at any given time—the student expert that
knows critical details of the design, the corporate

The real challenge exists at the end of the flight
competition, after the downselect to the "flight"
nanosats, where there exists great tension between
educating students in assembly, integration, test,
launch, and on-orbit operations, and finalizing a real,
flyable satellite product. Without a potential flight, the
intrinsic student motivation is greatly reduced. The
constraints of personnel turnover, very small budget,
and short schedule still exist at the university level, with
the added burden of yet-more-unyielding government
schedule and budget demands.
For the flight
competition winners, Program tolerance for “amateur”
mistakes is greatly reduced if the satellites are to make
it to orbit. The real insight is how much the
government at this point should control the decisions
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engineering design does not begin this essential
transformation until he or she enters the workforce. In
marked contrast, by the end of their UNP experience,
students participating in the Program have designed,
manufactured, properly documented and system tested
their protoflight spacecraft.

memory (to prevent reinventing the wheel), and the
army of personnel that can support critical activities
like
integration
and
launch
opportunities.
Fundamentally, this applies to the UNP Program Office
as well. The UNP Program Office at AFRL runs most
effectively with one entity providing direction and
corporate memory (program manager), one entity
having depth of expert knowledge on the systems
(systems engineer), and a backup army of engineers and
technicians that provide integration, test and launch
support. With both the government system and the
university system mirroring each other, there is the
added benefit of some redundancy and the system
works.

The University Nanosat Program has the best and
brightest students at its fingertips to offer opinions on
the satellite design and competition process. Among
the eleven schools competing in the Nanosat-4
competition, and the thirteen schools that completed the
Nanosat-3 competition, students from two schools were
asked to provide a brief synopsis of lessons learned and
a record of successful implementations, challenges to
overcome, and the critical all-important intangibles.

UNP PARTICIPANTS’ PERSPECTIVES

Washington University in St. Louis is a participant in
the Nanosat-4 competition and was a top finisher in
Nanosat-3. Their nanosat system, “Bandit/Akoya”,
faces challenges both common and unique.
Bandit/Akoya is designed as a drone/mother spacecraft,
in which Bandit deploys from Akoya and performs
proximity operations, docking and recharge with
Akoya.

“It’s like being fired out of a cannon at a stampeding
herd of buffalo” – Greg Holt, University of Texas PhD
candidate, preparing new students for a technical
review by the UNP Program Office.

The University of Texas at Austin was chosen as the
winner of Nanosat-3. Their FASTRAC (Formation
Autonomous Spacecraft with Thruster, Relativenavigation, Attitude and Crosslink) satellite design
landed them the job of taking their engineering design
unit concept to a flight quality spacecraft in a year’s
timeframe, along with the associated additional
challenges faced by this rigorous process. The two
identical FASTRAC satellites are designed to separate
in orbit and perform relative GPS navigation using
single-antenna attitude determination. FASTRAC is
the first student built satellite project at The University
of Texas.

Figure 3. Nanosat-3 Flight Competition Review
The benefits of the UNP are made clear by examining
the experiences of its participants. Most students enter
the Program with a very theoretical background in
engineering and perhaps, some limited research or
design experience. All universities provide students
with a thorough background in analysis and the theory
of engineering in many sub-disciplines. However, the
design process largely resides on the periphery of this
education and is left to semester-long senior design
projects and independent research courses. This is due
to the very nature of most institutions of higher
education. Independent research in the academic
setting usually lacks intensive oversight from practicing
spacecraft engineers, while the senior-design classes
involve mostly short-term paper-projects with at most a
brief foray into the manufacturing process. From the
perspective of one student: it is curious to note that
while architecture students and other scholars of design
spend years of their education in studio courses, honing
creative problem solving and implementation skills and
complementing their theoretical education with a solid
immersion in practice, the average student of
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Student Leadership Challenges and Rewards
“We are doing something no one has done before.” –
Dr. E. Glenn Lightsey, UT-Austin Professor of
Aerospace Engineering and Principal Investigator on
the FASTRAC project
The Bandit/Akoya project has had a "collective" of
student team managers, in which the students with the
most education experience and involved the longest are
by default part of project management. In the case of
FASTRAC, the project has had two student leads since
the beginning of the Nanosat-3 design competition
(2003). The first lead, now a graduating PhD in
aerospace engineering, led an initial group of about 30
UT students on FASTRAC, while teaching
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undergraduate classes, and a working on his
dissertation. The subsequent student leader literally
"grew up" from within the project, starting out as
undergraduate on the team, becoming the FASTRAC
systems engineer and now the program manager, while
completing a Masters degree in aerospace engineering.

Student Workforce Challenges and Rewards
“A considerable amount of the talent [foreign students
on temporary visas] being trained at our universities
cannot contribute to the U.S. aerospace industry or to
the long-term development of the U.S. economy.” –
Final Report Of The Commission On The Future Of
The United States Aerospace Industry, Nov 2002.

Successful communication between team leaders and
the UNP Program Office at AFRL, and between team
leaders and the team workers is the key to success for
any university project involved in the Nanosat Program.
On the Bandit project most communication was initially
done via email through the student systems engineering
lead. Since the role of systems engineering (and hence,
the systems engineer) is somewhat of a mystery to
virtually all students, this became a problem when the
subsystem designs got to the point that they required
input from other systems. Communication problems
are also made worse by the university environment
where project members' schedules and commitment
vary widely. Within the Bandit program, a weekly
team leader meeting was used to keep everyone abreast
of the latest developments. The weekly meetings were
most effective when each sub-team presented the
previous week's work and outlined the coming week’s
goals. The Bandit project also used an internal Wiki
web site as a central repository to store and share
information.

Like other UNP university participants, UT had a small,
nuclear design team, a body of students interested in
satellite design and flight-build, and the support of
talented faculty serving as the investigators for the
project. Second only to configuration management,
team management is an often-underestimated
component of student projects. It is here, however,
where the small group-project style setting gives
universities an advantage over larger entities. This was
particularly critical in the design stage of the UT
projects where a small design group of five to ten
people was able to implement necessary changes
swiftly without the need of complex documentation or
extra personnel. This team setting also provided for an
efficient means of formal and informal communication
between the subsystem-leads and encouraged overlap of
responsibilities which eventually fostered a workable
understanding of the system-level design. In addition,
students beginning in the project had virtually no
previous experience in satellite design. Although much
had to be learned with the help of the UNP Program
Office at AFRL and industry experts, this tabula-rosa
effect provided the opportunity for novel approaches to
the design and build process. Not being negatively
affected by a industry biases, the team was open to any
new process or solution which solved the problem
within the given constraints.

Project scheduling is another area where student
leadership encounters difficulty. Many of the problems
that arise with schedule are the result of simple
inexperience on the part of the student leadership.
Without experience with such things as modeling,
drafting, manufacturing lead-times, and testing, it is
very difficult to estimate how long a task will take,
what a reasonable deadline for the task is, and how to
break a task into smaller and more manageable
sections. This is especially true since most students
estimate that the system design and specification
process will take up most of the schedule, when in fact
the manufacture and test phases are typically the
longest in duration.

Student recruitment can be the biggest challenge to a
Nanosat team, which is longer term than the typical
single semester design project. How does one convince
students that they should devote large amounts of their
time working on a satellite, instead of some other
activity which requires a lower level of commitment?
It can be difficult to recruit skilled upper classmen
because by the time students reach junior and senior
year they have already made commitments to other
projects and groups. This was the Bandit team's largest
problem. Because of the difficulty of recruiting
upperclassmen, that team's approach has been to recruit
underclassmen to the program and then train them and
keep them involved in progressively larger aspects of
the project. This approach worked well, but was a huge
time and energy burden to those managing the
recruitment effort. The one way in which the Bandit
project recruited upper classmen was through
independent studies, where the participating students

All universities involved in the Program are encouraged
to team with industry and potentially develop
mentorship relations. Internships with industry
indirectly related to Nanosat are common, which
greatly assist in the "training up" of good student
project managers.
In the past, working level
relationships have been fostered and student leaders
from the Nanosat teams have been hired into the
Program's industry partners upon graduating.
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worked on discrete aspects of the satellite and received
credit for their work.

The University Nanosat Program, among specifying
constraints, requirements, design do’s and do not’s,
technical direction and advice, also offers and requires
the students involved to rise to the level of the
professional world and produce a rigorous
configuration management process. It is said that for a
satellite to be successfully launched, that three times its
weight in paper must be produced. This is to prove to
all stakeholders (including the launch providers) that
every possible satellite feature physically built is
understood completely; meets all applicable safety
requirements; and that all fasteners, software, machined
structure, detailing, connectors, surface finish, mass,
strength, safety features, and repaired problems are
indeed what is physically mated to the launch vehicle.
Within UNP, there is an enormous task and challenge to
convince a multi-million dollar launch vehicle provider
to accept a ~$100,000 student-built satellite as a
secondary payload.

Turnover is problematic for all UNP participants. On
the FASTRAC project, of the seven or so students on
the original design team, many graduated, and only
three remained during the flight build when the team
had grown to roughly thirty people. Larger teams mean
higher turnover and loss of knowledge, and as the team
grew it became apparent that the configuration and
document management methods were insufficient to
propagate information to newer student team members,
much less to subsequent flight projects at UT (UT
participates in both Nanosat-3 and Nanosat-4).
Every May (at the end of spring semester), the most
experienced students on the team graduate and leave the
team. In addition attrition due to graduation, a certain
percentage of students come and go as time, schedule
and interest permit. This leads to a very transient work
force. The constant turnover magnifies other problems
such as inter-team communication and student training.
On small teams, turnover can lead to core team
members "burning out" over the course of the program
as they attempt to "do it all" themselves. The Bandit
project experienced this effect during the semester
following the completion of the Nanosat-3 flight
competition.
(Like UT, Washington University
participates in both Nanosat-3 and Nanosat-4, and is
continuing the Bandit/Akoya development as part of the
Nanosat-4 competition.) An entire semester's work was
completely lost as the team members, who had been
overworked the semester before, recovered and
regained their interest in the project. Losses and
negative impacts occur as well due to scheduling issues
as well. The Bandit team typically loses productivity
for 4 out of the 16 weeks in a semester due to exams
and breaks.

Rigorous
documentation
and
configuration
management turned out to be the Achilles heel of many
of the universities involved, and even those which had
been successful in the past have found themselves
unable to pass on information and experience to new
students on their teams. It is a common thread that
most
students
face
stringent
documentation
requirements with aversion, and that small student
teams (like on FASTRAC) see it as unnecessary
overhead.
However, as the FASTRAC project
progressed and the team grew, many previous mistakes
were revisited as a result of information loss. With the
help of student management and oversight by the UNP
Progrram Office at AFRL, FASTRAC was able to
implement a successful documentation subsystem in
time to save the flight build effort from coming to a
halt.
FASTRAC employed a graduate computer
science student to build an online document
management system. Documents are updated real time
and accessed by team members as well as the UNP
Program Office to be discussed during system
engineering and integration meetings.

Since the Bandit project resides in the Mechanical and
Aerospace department at Washington University, only
mechanical engineering credit may be offered for work
on the satellite. As a result, Bandit has a large number
of upper classmen mechanical and aerospace
engineering students but very few from other majors.
The same limitation also applies to lab resources. For
Bandit it is difficult to get access to the student
electrical and computer science labs, while it is easy to
get access to the mechanical labs.

An example among the documentation requirements is
the structural analysis. Its function is to ensure the
satellite is "overbuilt" and will easily survive the launch
environment. Due to a lack of a sufficient number of
students capable of structural modeling, the finite
element models that were produced for the initial
FASTRAC concept were never updated as the design
evolved. Also, due to lack of design foresight (namely,
systems engineering allocation and tracking), the
FASTRAC design mass increased substantially during
the final stages of design and build. The structural
analysis lagged behind this process. Without satisfying

Student Intangibles
After the flight competition downselect, students from
the winning design teams are tempted to think, "We
won the flight competition! So we’re done, right?"
Wrong. The real effort is just beginning at this point.
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the structural requirements (demonstrated in part
through analysis), the spacecraft could not be delivered
for final integration for flight until this document was
produced. The team learned the hard way that
documentation is a key schedule driver for any
university flight project.

LESSONS LEARNED AND SUMMARY
The single-most important and most-overlooked part of
the design process is the establishment of a sound
systems engineering process, which begins with
rigorous requirements definition and flows down into
design synthesis.
It is the University Nanosat
Program's experience that most universities do not truly
understanding the systems engineering process at all.
The general lack of space systems engineering training
in U.S. higher education "flows up" into government
and industry, once students enter the space workforce.
Arguably, past failures of government and commercial
missions have shown that government and industry still
have difficulty implementing "good" systems
engineering processes, and would benefit from more
and better trained space systems engineers. The
primary goal of the University Nanosat Program is to
effectively bridge the space systems engineering
"personnel training gap" by accomplishing this critical
training at the university level (vs. training new hires
once they enter the workforce).

After the Nanosat-3 flight competition, FASTRAC’s
flight build and hardware acquisition and management
process became much more rigorous. The team was
under a much more focused level of scrutiny. As
anyone in the industry knows, the quality of process
oversight is directly dependent on the quality of a
project's configuration management, but even a well
documented student project still needs to learn the
nuances of dealing with and overseeing vendors. The
FASTRAC team learned many painful but valuable
lessons through missteps in machine shop deliveries,
unexpected (unresearched) lead times, and unacceptable
certifications of compliance or parts which simply did
not meet the specifications. FASTRAC made use of
many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components for
which acceptable documentation is unavailable or
nonexistent. The team learned that most vendors are
not prepared to deal with the nuances of spaceflight
hardware. FASTRAC was able to adapt many of its
COTS components for use in space and had to dedicate
much project management time to oversee and work
extremely closely with vendors and machine shops to
the extent required to produce the necessary
qualification paperwork.

UNP succeeds very well at giving students these
valuable tools, by giving students involved in UNP the
option to initially fail, then learn and eventually
succeed, within the context of real-world flight
opportunities. The UNP experience produces aerospace
professionals who understand the modes, the
consequences and the price of failure.
The FASTRAC team ran into many difficulties and
slowdowns over the misinterpretation, confusion, and
oversight of requirements. While key requirements do
flow down from the UNP, many of the team’s own
objectives were never well-defined in requirement
documentation before the final flight build.
Furthermore, some requirements which were vaguely
defined were not interpreted properly. Having a well
defined experiment and flowing down the requirements
early on is key to building a successful satellite mission,
but maintaining the awareness of those requirements is
just as important. Requirements can flow down from
mission objectives, launch providers, or the principal
investigator, and most students do not realize the
importance of requirements sources and documentation
to the success of a multi-year flight project. Based on
the experience of Nanosat-3, the UNP Program Office
has implemented continuous improvement processes
which will focus the Nanosat-4 and follow-on
competition cycles on the importance and systematic
adoption of rigorous systems engineering processes like
requirements generation and flow-down, and where
they belong in the iterative design process.

It is impossible to extol the successes of FASTRAC
without crediting the government and industry
relationships which were forged during the project, and
which serve as a contra-positive to the above paragraph.
Notable were the team’s interactions with Planetary
Systems Corporation, which provided FASTRAC with
a flight qualified satellite on-orbit separation system;
Composite Technologies Development, which provided
state of the art miniature composite fuel tank
technology for spaceflight demonstration; and AFRL,
which provided the direction to distinguish between
critical issues and those which could be easily solved or
circumvented. The lesson learned was that the "soft"
skills required to maintain personal relationships with
other people in the business are key to success. With
vendors, FASTRAC was able to obtaining costly and/or
process-sensitive components, while providing direct
business benefit to those organizations.
It was
important to seek out the companies willing to put in
the extra work in exchange for test data (obtained
during FASTRAC system test), student labor, publicity,
or potential flight demonstration for their products.
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SSC06-VII-4
For the FASTRAC team, the best systems engineering
experience was gained by working with the design and
integration of actual flight hardware systems. Starting
with the design and construction of the EDU model of
the FASTRAC satellite, through integration and test a
fully functioning flat-sat (table-top electrical functional
model), and putting together comprehensive and
updated CAD models, the team was able to learn proper
methods of subsystem interface design and test. The
team found that most of the technical problems
occurred not on the component level, but in the
interfaces such as software messages, wiring harnesses,
attachment brackets, EGSE and MGSE subsystems, and
even the fasteners. This will come as no surprise to
experienced engineers but it is important to note that
this level of system design awareness comes as a
completely foreign concept to most students, who are
usually taught to focus on a specific discipline, and in
the process "lose the forest for the trees." One of the
advantages of a student design-build-and-fly project is
that the spacecraft bus engineers and the experiment
engineers are able to work very closely and often share
responsibilities. Ultimately however, the success of a
systems-level design hinges on the team’s ability to
teach itself the tools and methodology to deal with
systems interfaces.

CONCLUSION
The need for an education experience like that provided
by the University Nanosatellite Program is most dire in
the area of spacecraft design, where engineers cope
with creating technology that functions efficiently,
reliably, and remotely in the most hostile of
environments. By providing expert oversight,
educational workshops, and the sponsorship by which
universities can take a small satellite from concept to
flight-build, the UNP program trains today’s
engineering students to be better prepared for the everincreasing challenges of tomorrow’s spacecraft
missions. Furthermore, the intensity of the program is
unmatched in the U. S. by any other design experience
on the university level. Students learn not only the
principles and practices of systems engineering and
satellite design, build, test, and flight, but also learn to
infuse the proper rigor and scrutiny into their analysis,
design, and implementation. The latter is a key
ingredient to all engineering disciplines. Students
departing the UNP program for the "real world" find
themselves well-prepared to solve industry problems.
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